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UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM:
THE FAILURE OF NEW JERSEY’S 2004–2005 PAY-TO-PLAY
REFORMS TO CURB CORRUPTION AND THE
APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION
Kevin Weber ∗
Money, like water, will always find an outlet.
I.

1

INTRODUCTION

On November 15, 2004, New Jersey Senate President Richard
2
Codey assumed the office of Governor of New Jersey, following the
3
resignation of Governor James E. McGreevey. Among his pledges
4
upon assuming office was to end the practice in New Jersey known as
5
“pay-to-play.” “‘Pay-to-play’ is the political practice of rewarding
6
campaign contributors with no-bid government contracts.” Critics
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Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University; B.A.,
2002, Rutgers College, Rutgers University.
1
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003). This quotation
from Justice O’Connor is based on the understanding that as government keeps
regulating political contributions and advocacy, the money finds new outlets. See also
Kathleen Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 312
(1998) (“[T]he restriction on formal campaign contributions has had predictable
substitution effects. Barred from giving to candidates or limited in the amount that
they can give, corporations, labor unions, [Political Action Committees], and wealthy
individuals have shifted resources into other forms of political advocacy and association.”).
2
See N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ¶ 6.
3
Laura Mansnerus, A Governor Resigns: Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at A1.
4
Richard J. Codey, Acting New Jersey Governor, State of the State Address (Jan.
11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/speech
?contentId=16583).
5
Id. (“Governor McGreevey’s Executive Order on pay to play . . . must become a
permanent law. And I am 100% committed to getting that done in the very near future.”).
6
Paula A. Franzese & Daniel J. O’Hern, Sr., Restoring the Public Trust: An Agenda
for Ethics Reform of State Government and a Proposed Model for New Jersey, 57 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1175, 1222 (2005).
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describe pay-to-play as a hidden tax, as it increases the cost of gov7
ernment.
Shortly before leaving office, Governor McGreevey signed an
8
Executive Order to ban this practice, and upon taking office, Governor Codey promised to push the legislature to codify the Executive
9
Order in legislation. Among Governor Codey’s promises and proposals to reform the broken system were the creation of an independent state ethics commission, a new plain-language ethics guide
for state employees, a new business ethics guide, stiffer penalties for
10
ethical transgressions, and greater public disclosure. Arguably, the
most important and most public of his proposals was the proposed
statute banning pay-to-play.
In response to New Jersey’s perceived culture of corruption and
“[s]candals [that] have shaken the public’s trust,” there was a public
11
outcry to reform the state’s campaign finance system. Accusations
12
of pay-to-play were common, touching both Republicans and De13
mocrats in recent years. However, as insidious and corrupting as
this confluence of money and politics appeared to be, it was nevertheless perfectly legal in New Jersey, so long as there was no “quid pro
14
quo.” Under New Jersey law, specifically the Local Public Contracts
Law and the Criminal Code, a campaign contribution donated in exchange for a government contract is, in fact, illegal, but “the problem
is proving the connection between the contributions and the con15
tract.” Thus, as proving the illegal quid pro quo is often largely futile, New Jersey’s elected officials took the next logical step: attempting to tighten the restrictions on campaign contributions from
businesses holding and seeking public contracts.
7

James Prado Roberts & Paul D’Ambrosio, Ante Up, if You Want to Get in the
Game, ASBURY PARK PRESS, June 6, 2004.
8
Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (Sept. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm.
9
Codey, supra note 4.
10
Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1177.
11
Id. at 1176; see also NJ.com, Corruption, http://www.nj.com/corruption (last
visited Feb. 15, 2008) (collecting investigative reports on New Jersey corruption).
12
David Kocieniewski, Errors Emerge as Exhaust Test Is Introduced in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at B1 (recounting accusations of pay-to-play in Republican Governor Christine Whitman’s administration).
13
Laura Mansnerus, Who Are the Lawyers Packing All the Clout?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2005, § 14, at 1 (showing that law firms donating to the Democrats received favorable
public contracts).
14
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-20 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (noting that prohibited donations include anything that “seek[s] to influence the content, introduction,
passage or defeat of legislation”).
15
Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1222.
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This Comment discusses the recent history of New Jersey’s campaign finance reform, specifically the 2004–2005 pay-to-play reforms,
and argues that the current statutory framework fails to curb actual
corruption, as well as the appearance of corruption, in New Jersey
politics. Part II of this Comment defines political corruption, and
traces the history of political corruption in New Jersey. Part III examines the current statutory framework of New Jersey’s campaign finance system, discusses the current law on restricting political contributions, and examines the first challenge to the pay-to-play statute.
Part IV examines the failures of New Jersey’s campaign finance
scheme, including the loopholes that businesses, contributors, and
politicians use to exploit the system. Part V discusses proposed measures to fix the system, including proposed bills in the New Jersey Legislature and an examination of campaign finance laws in other states.
Part VI concludes by describing what measures should be taken to fix
the current problem and detailing which provisions of the current
system should be left unchanged.
II. DEFINING CORRUPTION AND TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF
CORRUPTION IN NEW JERSEY
A. Corruption of Officials, Corruption of the Voter
16

New Jersey has a sordid history of political corruption dating
17
back to the days of “Boss” Frank Hague, the mayor of Jersey City
from 1917 to 1947, who oversaw a machine of patronage and kick18
backs. However, an elected official can still be “corrupted” without
receiving an outright bribe:
[o]nce we get beyond classical corruption, political spending is
useful to a politician to the extent, and only to the extent, that it
enables him to attain or retain office. For money to “corrupt,”
then, an elected official must be able to shade his conduct away
from what a constituent-serving or public-regarding representa19
tive would do . . . .
16

See NJ.com, Corruption, http://www.nj.com/corruption (last visited Feb. 20,
2008) (collecting investigative reports on New Jersey political corruption).
17
Staff Report, Who’s the Boss?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 24,
2004, at A7.
18
Joseph Sullivan, The Trial of Hudson Corruption Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1983,
§ 4, at 6 (noting that Frank Hague was “a figure who dominated state politics for four
decades and who laughed at investigations aimed at uncovering how he became a
millionaire on a mayor’s salary”).
19
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1720 (1999).
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That is, an official is “corrupted” if a campaign donation changed his
vote or executive decision from what he otherwise would have done.
20
In Colorado Republican II, Justice Souter defined “corruption [as] being understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such
21
influence.” Thus, campaign donations, arguably, have the ability to
corrupt an official as much as an outright bribe. While some commentators argue that campaign finance reform has largely been a
failure in practice, as the money of advocates always finds an outlet
(i.e., politicians continue to be actually corrupted despite increased
22
regulation), it must be remembered that the purpose of campaign
finance reform is not only to stop actual corruption, but the appear23
ance of corruption as well.
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s
24
landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court noted that “the primary interest served by [campaign finance regulations] . . . is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the
real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions
25
on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.”
While outright bribery certainly still exists, at times, in New Jer26
sey, a more subtle form of corruption has largely replaced the explicit pay-off. Today, favoritism in the awarding of public contracts
and access to decision-makers is insidiously traded for large campaign
donations, fundamentally replacing the direct kickback of years past.
In recent years, as the cost of campaigns in the media age has increased exponentially, politicians have aggressively increased their
27
fundraising operations. As there is “near-universal agreement that
20

533 U.S. 431 (2001).
Id. at 441 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t Political Action Comm., 528
U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000)).
22
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 1, at 311.
23
Dennis Thompson, Law and Democracy: A Symposium on the Law Governing Our
Democratic Process: Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1036 (2005) (“Why should campaigns be regulated? To
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption is the answer the Supreme
Court gives in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n . . . .”).
24
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
26
Ronald Smothers, 11 Officials in New Jersey Snared After 4-Year Operation by F.B.I.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at A1.
27
Rachel Leon, Cash and Carry Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 14, at 13
(Op-Ed). Leon, the executive director of Common Cause New York, notes that
“when adjusted for inflation, the cost of a winning campaign has more than doubled
since 1986, and has increased sixfold since 1990.” Id. Though Leon uses data for
New York state candidates, as most New Jersey state candidates advertise in the New
York media market, the results would likely be similar.
21

WEBER (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:40:47 PM

COMMENT

1447

the functional relationship between political spending and political
28
success is essentially positive,” there is no reason to believe that politicians will not spend as much as they can possibly raise in the fore29
seeable future.
This recent trend of hyper-elevated spending on
30
campaigns has been called “corruption of the voter.” As candidates
and elected officials continue to accept donations to buy media and
advertising to influence voters, it becomes the voter who is corrupted,
essentially bought-off with slickly produced advertisements, their attention diverted from more civic-minded questions when casting
31
their votes.
A difficult question arises when attempting to discern the difference between permissible levels of influence and illegal corruption.
The vital difference, it has been argued, is the link between the
money and the official action. “Only when the connection between
the contribution and some favor is especially close should there be
any reason to worry about corruption . . . . [T]he connection between the contribution and the favor must be close in two senses:
32
proximate in time and explicit in word or deed.” Some would argue
that “[c]ampaign finance reform protects the integrity of the Ameri33
While this may be true as a
can political-governmental process.”
general proposition, politicians in New Jersey recently have seemed
more concerned with only curbing the appearance of corruption,
rather than attempting to curb the actual corruptive influence of
34
money on the system. A somewhat cynical view would be that New
Jersey politicians passed a faux reform, rife with loopholes and the
benefit of which was marginal at best, in an effort to appear vigilant
on corruption while preserving the status quo.

28

Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 19, at 1708–09.
Joe Donahue, Lawmakers Break the Bank on Races, TRENTON TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007,
at A1 (noting that spending on New Jersey’s legislative campaigns ballooned from
$57 million in 2003 to $69 million in 2007).
30
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 19, at 1708 (“[F]or all the rhetorical focus on
money’s role in corrupting candidates and elected officials, the critical problem
turns out to be that political money corrupts voters.”) (emphasis added).
31
See Thompson, supra note 23, at 1037 (referring to the diversion of the electorate from civic minded questions as “electoral corruption”).
32
Id. at 1044.
33
Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 768 (2003).
34
Jason Method, Codey: Existing Reforms Largely Sufficient, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept.
30, 2007, available at http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070930/
NEWS/70930003/0/SPECIAL10 (quoting Senate President Codey as saying, “[w]e
can pass all the laws to try and stop corruption, but someone who is determined to be
corrupt is not going to be stopped by any laws”).
29
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B. Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption in New Jersey
One of the most prolific sources of campaign cash in New Jersey
has been those firms and companies seeking lucrative government
contracts. In New Jersey, the state’s contract procurement laws say
35
that the contract does not need to go to the lowest bidder. The
State can accept whichever bid it feels will “be most advantageous to
36
the State, price and other factors considered.” Thus, state officials
have tremendous latitude when doling out contracts, with little to
stop an official from steering a contract to whomever he or she
37
chooses, including a campaign supporter.
Between 1994 and 2001, the administration of Republican Governor Christine Whitman received some negative press attention
when the state awarded a $463 million contract for auto emissions
38
testing to the Parsons Infrastructure and Technology Company.
Campaign finance reports reveal that Parsons made $62,000 in cam39
paign contributions to Republican committees. While there were
never any allegations that campaign dollars were traded quid pro quo
for preferential treatment, the appearance of impropriety existed to
many observers, and the State Senate conducted hearings on the mat40
ter.
The subsequent administration of Democratic Governor James
McGreevey was no different, and the practice of pay-to-play continued. In fact, after leaving office, McGreevey admitted that nobody
41
“benefited from ‘pay-to-play’ more than [he] did.” Upon taking office in 2001, several supporters of Governor McGreevey’s past cam42
paigns received lucrative contracts. The years of the Whitman administration were lean for some firms and corporations with strong
Democratic Party ties, and the incoming administration was a chance
43
to reclaim some of these extremely lucrative public contracts.
35

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
Id. § 52:34-12(g).
37
See Commercial Cleaning Corp. v. Sullivan, 47 N.J. 539, 548 (1966) (holding
that the Executive branch has broad discretion under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12 to
“determine who is the ‘responsible bidder,’ [and] which bid will be most advantageous to the State, ‘price and other factors considered’”).
38
Kocieniewski, supra note 12, at B1.
39
Id.
40
Iver Peterson, Public’s Chance to Inspect Emissions-Test Contracting, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2001, at B5.
41
JAMES E. MCGREEVEY WITH DAVID FRANCE, THE CONFESSION 337 (2006).
42
Mansnerus, supra note 13, at § 14, 1.
43
Id. “One firm closely identified with the McGreevey administration was
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer of Woodbridge, where Mr. McGreevey was mayor.
When he took office, Mr. McGreevey rewarded Wilentz with a new client, the enor36
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Rewarding your supporters and hurting your enemies is business
44
as usual in New Jersey, and is not limited to the state level. Outright
corruption, as well as pay-to-play, is practiced at the local level as well.
45
Straightforward bribery exists in both upper-class suburbia and
46
poorer inner-cities in New Jersey as does legal pay-to-play, where
municipal and county officials grant contracts and receive corporate
47
campaign contributions.
III. REFORMING NEW JERSEY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM AND THE
CURRENT LAW
A. An Attempt at Reforming Pay-to-Play
On August 12, 2004, Governor McGreevey announced that he
48
would resign, effective November 15, 2004. As a “lame duck” and
49
saying he felt liberated from the corruptive influence of the political
bosses who wield incredible influence in New Jersey through the pay50
to-play process, Governor McGreevey issued Executive Order No.
51
134 on September 22, 2004. McGreevey later called this an “atom
52
bomb in the world of New Jersey politics.” The governor’s intention
was to “insulate the negotiation and award of State contracts from political contributions that pose the risk of improper influence, pur-

mous Turnpike Authority; he took it away from the Republican favorite Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Peretti.” Id. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer made extensive
contributions to Governor McGreevey’s campaign. Id.
44
Richard Lezin Jones, State Senator Who Combines Donations, Law Practice, and Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at B1. State Senator Raymond Lesniak spoke regarding the connection between his financial support to candidates and subsequent contracts for his firm. Id. “People say, ‘You raise money for people who get elected and
then they hire your law firm.’ I go, ‘Shocking, isn’t it?’ Are you supposed to hire
people who donated to your opponent?” Id.
45
Smothers, supra note 26, at A1.
46
David Halbfinger, Hudson County Leader Quits Amid Signs of Federal Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at B2.
47
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 44, at B1; Staff Report, supra note 17, at A7. Controlling these local fiefdoms that grant contracts totaling billions of dollars each year is
arguably as important as influencing the award of contracts at the state level. Id.
48
Laura Mansnerus, McGreevey Steps Down After Disclosing a Gay Affair, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2004, at A1.
49
MCGREEVEY WITH FRANCE, supra note 41, at 336–40.
50
Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm (describing the power of
county bosses in the preamble).
51
Id.
52
MCGREEVEY WITH FRANCE, supra note 41, at 336–40.
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The Executive Order

shall not enter into an agreement or otherwise contract to procure from any business entity services or any material, supplies or
equipment, or to acquire, sell, or lease any land or building,
where the value of the transaction exceeds $17,500, if that business entity has solicited or made any contribution of money, or
pledge of contribution, including in-kind contributions to a candidate committee and/or election fund of any candidate or
holder of the public office of Governor, or to any State or county
54
political party committee . . . .

There was some initial veiled displeasure with Governor McGreevey’s
Executive Order. One prominent Democrat, Assembly Majority
Leader Joseph Roberts, asked the non-partisan Office of Legislative
Services for an opinion as to whether the Governor had the power to
55
issue such a law via an executive order, bypassing the legislature.
The opinion letter from the Office of Legislative Services agreed that
the Executive Order “infringes upon the lawmaking power of the legislature and does not ‘comport with the constitutional principle of
56
separation of powers.’”
The questionable legality of the Executive Order was problematic for the incoming Governor Codey, who in his State of the State
address soon after assuming office pledged a reformist and ethical
57
course for New Jersey. Governor Codey would soon deliver on his
pledge to codify McGreevey’s Executive Order into legislation. On
58
March 22, 2005, Governor Codey signed bill A1500/S2052, which
his press release trumpeted as “one of the nation’s strongest statewide
59
pay-to-play bans.”

53

See Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm.
54
Id.
55
Letter from Albert Porroni, Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative Services,
to Hon. Joseph Roberts, Assemblyman (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with author).
56
Id. (quoting Commc’ns Workers v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 450–51 (1992)).
57
Codey, supra note 4 (“I assumed this office at a time of political upheaval . . . .
Our faith in government had been shaken. But this moment in history has given us
the opportunity to chart a new course. Together, we have begun to restore faith, integrity, and hope to our government.”).
58
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
59
Press Release, Acting Governor Richard Codey, Codey Signs Pay-to-Play Ban
into Law (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/governor/
njnewsline/view_article.pl?id=2427.

WEBER (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:40:47 PM

COMMENT

1451

The language of this bill was virtually identical to Governor
60
McGreevey’s Executive Order, other than a new section that said
that this new law “shall not . . . apply in circumstances when it is determined by the federal government or a court of competent jurisdic61
tion that its application would violate federal law or regulation.”
The legislature added this passage as a significant problem emerged.
According to the Federal Highway Administration, New Jersey’s pay62
The federal government deto-play ban violated federal law.
manded that New Jersey abandon its new pay-to-play law, or else it
would freeze “hundreds of millions of dollars in federal road funds”
headed for New Jersey, as the federal government claimed it was a
63
violation of federal competitive-bidding laws. Acting Governor
Codey challenged the Federal Highway Administration’s position in
64
65
court but was unsuccessful. The added language of section 20.25
would apparently allow the ban on pay-to-play to remain but kept a
66
loophole for projects that received federal highway dollars.
This was not the only problem that arose with the new legislation. In his Executive Order, McGreevey acknowledged the fluid nature of money in New Jersey politics, that is, that improper donations
did not necessarily need to flow directly to the public official they
67
were meant to influence.
In New Jersey, it is often the political
68
bosses of New Jersey’s twenty-one counties who “through their powers of endorsement, fundraising, ballot slogan or party line designation, and other means, exert significant influence over” candidates
69
for public office. Thus, pay-to-play is arguably more pervasive at the

60

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
Id.
62
See Certification of Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel J. Gibbons at 22, New Jersey
v. Mineta, No. 05-228 (D.N.J. 2005). Exhibit 10 is the final legal opinion from the
Federal Highway Administration to the New Jersey Department of Transportation,
where the federal government argued that the pay-to-play ban violated 23 U.S.C. §
112 (2006). Id.
63
Id.
64
Brief of Plaintiff, New Jersey v. Norman Y. Mineta, No. 05-228 (D.N.J. 2005).
65
Editorial, ‘Pay to Play’ in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A26. State campaign finance laws are preempted by federal law. See 2 U.S.C. § 453 (2000).
66
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
67
Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm. Note the preamble about
power of county bosses and their influence on the political process. Id.
68
See Paul D’Ambrosio, Like Puppeteers, Bosses Pull the Strings, ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 24, 2004, at A1.
69
Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm.
61
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local and county level, an area often unseen by the public, as it is less
scrutinized by the media.
However, what Executive Order No. 134 and the subsequent leg70
islation did not do was ban pay-to-play on the local and county level.
Moreover, there was concern and speculation that the new state law
preempted local governments from enacting more stringent campaign finance restrictions and bans on pay-to-play in their own juris71
dictions. Under state law
the local governmental units of this State may neither enact nor
enforce any ordinance or other local law or regulation conflicting
with, or preempted by, any provision of this code or with any policy of this State expressed by this code, whether that policy be expressed by inclusion of a provision in the code or by exclusion of
72
that subject from the code.

Seemingly, this statutory language would preempt a municipality
from enacting a law banning pay-to-play, as campaign finance was an
73
area reserved for regulation at the state level.
Governor Codey and the pro-reformists in the legislature began
to take steps to pass the so-called enabling legislation which would allow local governments to pass ordinances banning pay-to-play in their
jurisdictions. Under this new law
[a] county, municipality, independent authority, board of education, or fire district is hereby authorized to establish by ordinance,
resolution or regulation, as may be appropriate, measures limiting
the awarding of public contracts therefrom to business entities
that have made a contribution... and limiting the contributions
that the holders of a contract can make during the term of a contract, notwithstanding the provisions and parameters of [the
74
State’s pay-to-play ban].

This new law allowed local governments to enact their own, more
stringent, reform packages. As of June 2007, by one newspaper’s
count, eighty-one of New Jersey’s 566 municipalities had enacted
75
some form of their own pay-to-play reform. This was a major victory

70

Id. The Executive Order explicitly states that it applies to the state and governor candidates. Id.
71
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5(d) (West 2005) (local ordinances are preempted
by state statutes in some areas).
72
Id.
73
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, ¶ 11.
74
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-51 (West 1993 & Supp. 2007).
75
Editorial, Pay-to-Play Stays; Status Quid Pro Quo Rules Too Many Towns, BERGEN
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), June 19, 2007, at L6.
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for reform-minded legislators and groups such as Common Cause,
76
whose New Jersey chapter made it one of their signature issues.
B. The Current Law on the Restriction of Campaign Contributions
The seemingly insidious direct corporate campaign contributions under review in New Jersey have been completely outlawed for
77
federal candidates for some time. The Tillman Act of 1907 was the
first attempt by Congress to enact a ban on direct corporate contribu78
tions. However, the effectiveness of the Tillman Act was short-lived.
“In time, of course, corporations would find other ways to translate
their treasury funds into political influence, such as increased reliance on lobbying, company-funded political advertisements, covert
reimbursement of executive or employee contributions, and soft
79
money gifts to political parties.”
By 1971, “corporate leaders pushed Congress to add provisions
to the Federal Election Campaigns Act (FECA) clearly codifying their
80
ability to form voluntarily funded political committees.” “Formed
by corporations to collect voluntary contributions from their members, [Political Action Committees] may lawfully contribute to elec81
Over time, Political Action Committee (PAC)
toral candidates.”
donations to individual federal candidates were seemingly not a powerful enough vehicle for business corporations seeking to influence
the electoral process. Business corporations began circumventing the
system by making large contributions to the national political parties,
which in turn could work on voter turnout, registration, and issue ad82
vertisements. In 2002, Congress again sought to curtail the influ76

See Common Cause, http://www.commoncause.org/newjersey (last visited Feb.
20, 2008).
77
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000) (Supp. II 2003) (“It is unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to
any political office . . . .”); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
152–53 (2003) (upholding a ban on corporate contributions as a valid rationale for
preventing corruption).
78
Publicity of Political Contributions Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), amended
by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)).
79
Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 926 (2004).
80
Id. at 933.
81
Id. at 928 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (Supp. II 2003)).
82
Winkler, supra note 79 at 935–36 (“In coordination with their candidates, the
parties used soft money to pay for expensive advertisements during election campaigns. Soft money became a mechanism for corporations and unions to skirt the
contribution ban and donate general treasury funds for what was ultimately campaign spending.”).
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ence of corporate money in federal elections, and passed the Biparti83
san Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The BCRA banned the dona84
tions of so-called “soft money,” in essence ending the practice of
85
unlimited direct corporate contributions to the national parties.
BCRA’s limitation on corporate soft money contributions was upheld
by the Supreme Court of the United States in McConnell v. Federal Elec86
The Court’s decision in McConnell reflected the
tion Commission.
87
continuing rationale evolving from Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny:
that limitations on contributions, while subject to strict scrutiny, were
likely to be found constitutional, while limitations on campaign ex88
penditures were unlikely to pass strict scrutiny.
Of course, congressional actions and Supreme Court decisions
had no effect on candidates for state and local office in New Jersey,
who continued to solicit and receive direct contributions to their
89
election campaigns from corporate entities.
New Jersey is by no
means an anomaly. In fact, roughly half of the states still allow some
90
direct corporate campaign contributions. Only following a series of
political scandals and public outcry against perceived corruption did
New Jersey begin to pass laws that began to further limit corporate
83

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431–56 (2006)).
84
2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006) (providing the Federal Election Commission’s definition
of a legal campaign contribution).
85
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003). See also Winkler,
supra note 79, at 936 (“The BCRA simply barred corporations and unions from using
general treasury funds to make contributions to political parties. Once again, corporations and unions can still undertake the regulated activity—giving to parties—but
they must do so through the agency costs-reducing device of PACs.”).
86
Id. at 134.
87
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
88
Id. at 14. “[C]ontribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of
the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” Id. “A restriction on the amount
of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”
Id. at 19. “By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures . . . a limitation upon . . .
[contributions] entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to
engage in free communication.” Id. at 20.
89
See New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC),
http://www.elec.state.nj.us (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). Campaign disclosure reports
for state candidates confirm that state level candidates in New Jersey continued to
accept corporate donations that would be illegal for federal candidates. Id. See also
Joe Donahue, Kean Accepted Contributions From Firms He Sought to Ban, STAR LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 7, 2006, at 1.
90
Public Affairs Council, States That Prohibit Corporate Contributions,
http://www.pac.org/page/ethics/StatesthatProhibitCorporateContributions.shtml
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
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contributions, albeit only for those businesses holding or seeking
91
government contracts.
The constitutional legitimacy of subjecting businesses to stringent contribution regulations has been repeatedly upheld. In FEC v.
92
National Right to Work Committee, the Court upheld a federal law restricting the ability of corporations to raise funds for candidates from
non-members of the corporation. The Court unanimously found
that the government’s compelling interest in regulating corporate
donations outweighed the free association rights of the contributors,
holding “that substantial aggregations of [corporate] wealth” should
“not be converted into political ‘war chests’ which could be used to
incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contribu93
tions.”
However, just several years later in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., the Court held, by a 5-4 margin, that the segregated funds
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to an anti-abortion ad94
vocacy group formed as a nonprofit corporation. As the group’s
stated purpose was to influence policy and engage in issue advocacy,
and not to make profits, there was not the same level of danger of
95
corruption as there was with for-profit businesses.
But nonprofits may generally still be subjected to campaign fi96
nance regulation, as was held in FEC v. Beaumont, where the Court
reiterated that it will not “second-guess a legislative determination as
to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil
97
feared.” In FEC v. Beaumont, the Court distinguished FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. by noting that although the Court will “assume advocacy corporations are generally different from traditional
business corporations in the improbability that contributions they
might make would end up supporting causes that some of their
members would not approve” there still exists a legitimate concern
98
that nonprofits can corrupt the electoral process. Nonprofits, like
91

See Richard J. Codey, Acting New Jersey Governor, State of the State Address
(Jan. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/
speech?contentId=16583).
92
459 U.S. 197 (1982).
93
Id. at 207.
94
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986).
95
Id. at 259–60.
96
539 U.S. 146, 152–53 (2003).
97
Id. at 157 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197, 210 (1982)).
98
Id. at 159.
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“their for-profit counterparts, benefit from significant state-created
advantages, and may well be able to amass substantial political war
99
chests”; thus, the need for regulating their contributions remains.
Thus, the Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed its jurisprudence that corporate political speech may be subjected to stringent limitations, as corporations possess a unique ability to amass
great amounts of wealth, which could easily corrupt the electoral
100
It is important to note, however, that while the federal
process.
government treats a business’s PAC as an independent and distinct
entity from the corporation, New Jersey does not for the purposes of
101
its pay-to-play ban. New Jersey’s definition of a “business entity” includes “any subsidiaries directly or indirectly controlled by the business entity” and “any political organization organized under [S]ection
527 of the Internal Revenue Code that is directly or indirectly controlled
102
by the business entity . . . .” Thus, as New Jersey’s version of a PAC,
known as a Continuing Political Committee (CPC), is incorporated
under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, a business’s direct
contributions and its contributions from a CPC under its control
would both count towards the contribution limit for such a busi103
ness.
New Jersey would likely be within constitutional bounds to completely ban all corporate contributions to state candidates, as Congress has already done so for federal candidates, a decision that has
104
While a federal constitubeen repeatedly upheld by the courts.
tional challenge to New Jersey’s recent legislation is possible in the
99

Id. at 160 (internal quotations omitted). The Court held that applying the
prohibition on corporate donations to non-profit corporations was consistent with
the First Amendment, but that non-profit corporations, like all corporations, could
create a PAC that “may be wholly controlled by the sponsoring corporation, whose
employees and stockholders or members generally may be solicited for contributions.” Id. at 149.
100
James Weinstein, Contributions: Campaign Finance Reform and The First Amendment: An Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1062–65 (2002).
101
New Jersey’s version of a PAC is known as a Continuing Political Committee
(CPC). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-3n (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
102
Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (Sept. 22, 2004) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm.
103
Steven Sholk, A Guide to New Jersey Corporate Political Action Committees After the
2004 Campaign Finance Legislation and Executive Order, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 11, 36
(2004). “[I]f the corporation or an interest holder contributes to the corporation’s
CPC, and the CPC then contributes to a candidate or committee, ELEC [Election
Law Enforcement Commission] may take the position that as a matter of economic
substance, the corporation or interest holder made the contribution to the candidate
or committee.” Id. at 31.
104
See e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
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105

near future, such a challenge is likely to fail, based on the courts
repeated determinations that it will not second guess legislative determinations that a prophylactic remedy is necessary to deter corrup106
tion. Should it be shown that limiting contributions from CPCs was
narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in stopping corruption and
the appearance of corruption in the contract procurement process,
New Jersey’s law would survive a federal constitutional challenge.
Federal courts have previously granted the legislature the discretion
107
to determine how to uphold the integrity of its political process,
and if the New Jersey Legislature should determine that it is necessary
to limit CPC contributions to protect the integrity of New Jersey’s political process, then such a limitation would likely be upheld by a federal court.
Moreover, New Jersey, with its history of corruption and the ongoing appearance of corruption, would likely be within constitutional
bounds if it chose to drastically limit all campaign contributions. In
108
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court reviewed a Missouri legislative scheme that imposed contribution limits ranging
from $250 to $1000 depending on the office and size of the constitu109
The Nixon court defined what evidentiary obligation was
ency.
needed to be proven by the government for the regulations to pass
this level of scrutiny. In Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddle110
man, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit succinctly interpreted the required evidentiary standard of Nixon as thus:
state campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1) there is
adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently important state interest, and (2) if the limits are “closely drawn”—
i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on the state’s interest, (b) leave the
contributor free to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the
candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective cam111
paign.

In Nixon, the Supreme Court found Missouri’s contribution limits
were allowable because the government had met its evidentiary obligation, and there was no showing from the challengers that the contribution limits would dramatically affect the funding of political
105

Charles Stile, Ferriero Support of Pay-to-Play Stuns Democrats, BERGEN RECORD, Aug.
30, 2007, at A1.
106
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 157.
107
See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003).
108
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
109
Id. at 382.
110
345 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).
111
Id. at 1092.
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campaigns or otherwise prevent the running of effective cam112
paigns.
113
In the recent decision of Randall v. Sorrell, however, the Supreme Court found Vermont’s contribution limits were severely low,
114
and, therefore, were not narrowly tailored.
Vermont’s scheme had
mandated contribution limits as low as $400 for governor and other
115
statewide offices.
The Court found these limits would hamper the
116
ability to carry out effective campaigns, and thus laid out a more
117
exacting standard of how to narrowly tailor contribution limits.
118
In
Importantly, one such rationale was for “special justification.”
119
Vermont, there was no problem with corruption. However, in New
Jersey, where candidates for office have accepted bribes as low as
120
$500, a court may be more willing to allow more stringent campaign finance limits, should such “special justification” evidence be
put forward regarding New Jersey’s historical and ongoing problem
of corruption.
C. The First Challenge to the Pay-to-Play Law: State Constitutional
Grounds
In 2008 the new pay-to-play law was challenged in state court on
121
First Amendment grounds.
A New Jersey appellate court upheld
the law over a challenge from a public contractor excluded from obtaining future contracts by the New Jersey Department of Transporta122
Analyzing the New Jersey
tion because of their political donations.
law under the State Constitution’s free speech clause, in a way no
123
more restrictive than the Federal Constitution, the court did not
employ a level of strict scrutiny equaling a presumption against con124
stitutionality.
As the court noted, the correct level of scrutiny, un-

112

528 U.S. at 397.
548 U.S. 230 (2006).
114
Id. at 253.
115
Id. at 237.
116
Id. at 253.
117
Id. at 247–48.
118
Id. at 261.
119
Randall, 528 U.S. at 261.
120
Smothers, supra note 26, at A1.
121
In re Earle Asphalt Company, 950 A.2d 918 (App. Div. June 30, 2008).
122
Id. at 921.
123
Id. at 922, n.1 (citing Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 264
(1998)).
124
Id. at 923 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137
(2003)).
113
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der both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions, is that “a statute
limiting political contributions will be sustained ‘if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational free125
doms.’”
While the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the
constitutionality of legislation that “imposes targeted limitations upon
political contributions by a class of contributors considered to pose a
particularly serious threat” to preventing corruption and the appear126
ance of corruption, a New Jersey court has addressed such a statute.
In 1989, a New Jersey appellate court in the case of In re Petition of
Soto, upheld a portion of the Casino Control Act prohibiting political
donations by officers and employees of casinos. The court found a
high risk of vulnerability to corruption in this tightly regulated industry, justifying a compelling government interest in maintaining integ127
Thus, in response to the challenge to the pay-to-play law, the
rity.
court in In re Earle Asphalt found a similar “strong governmental interest in limiting political contributions by businesses that contract
128
with the State . . . .” The remaining question was whether the limitations were “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of asso129
ciational freedoms.”
Again referring back to Buckley, the court
found that the limitations of the new law were closely drawn, given
that the State’s “interest in safeguarding against the appearance of
impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the
130
process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated.”
IV. CORRUPTION AND THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION CONTINUE
UNDER THE NEW STATUTE
There are several problems and loopholes in the current statu131
tory scheme, once called among the strongest in the nation. As Justice O’Connor noted, “[m]oney, like water, will always find an out132
let.”
This section will examine some of these outlets and explore
125

Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
In re Earle Asphalt, 953 A.2d at 923 (citing In re Petition of Soto, 236 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 1989)).
127
In re Petition of Soto, 236 N.J. Super. 303, 321 (App. Div. 1989).
128
In re Earle Asphalt, 953 A.2d at 923.
129
Id. at 925 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
130
Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30).
131
Press Release, Acting Governor Richard Codey, Codey Signs Pay-to-Play Ban
Into Law (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/governor/
njnewsline/view_article.pl?id=2427.
132
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
126
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how money from state and local contractors continues to flow to public officials and political candidates.
A. The Fair-and-Open Contract Standard
Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming is that the same campaign
contributors that the legislation sought to preclude from obtaining
no-bid contracts can still contribute and then obtain government
133
Furcontracts that go through a “fair and open” bidding process.
thermore, once a contract has gone through such a “fair and open”
bidding process, the public entity is under no obligation to grant it to
the lowest bidder—the entity can choose whichever bidder it de134
sires. Per state law, a “fair and open” bidding process means
at a minimum, that the contract is (1) advertised in newspapers or
on the public entity’s website to give sufficient prior notice of the
contract; (2) awarded pursuant to public solicitation of proposals
or qualifications under criteria disclosed in writing prior to the solicitation; and (3) the proposals or qualifications are publicly
opened and announced when the contract is awarded. The public entity’s decision as to what is a fair and open process is final.
There is no requirement to award the contract to the lowest re135
sponsible bidder.

The above requirements that transform an illegal no-bid contract
into a legal contract are not particularly stringent. Thus, elected officials can advertise a public contract, receive several bids, and continue to award the contract to the friendly company that has showered them with campaign contributions, even though another
company’s bid was higher. Under the state rules, this would be per136
fectly legal and allowable.

133

Sholk, supra note 103, at 21–22.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12(g) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
135
Sholk, supra note 103, at 21–22.
136
Id. at 22 n.62. Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll, criticized the exception
for contracts awarded pursuant to a fair and open process, saying “[t]he bill also effectively allows a public entity to exempt itself from pay-to-play reform by declaring
itself to have a ‘fair and open’ process for the awarding of contracts, and that declaration is considered final under the terms of the bill.” Id. However, “the entity’s
contracting process need not require the selection of the lowest bidding responsible
bidder in order to be declared ‘fair and open.’ The bill also fails to address the potential influence of a political contribution on decisions regarding contracts already
awarded . . . which can have lucrative implications for contractors.” Id. (quoting Minority Statement to Assembly Bill A2, Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll, Assembly State Government Committee, 2004).
134
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B. The Continuing Problem of Pay-to-Play at the Local and County
Level
Another gap in the statutory scheme is that the current legislation applies only to the state, and not to local and county level governments. This loophole is (somewhat ironically) discussed on the
137
Dewebsite of the State Division of Local Government Services.
signed to help local government officials navigate the complex and
unfamiliar framework of the pay-to-play legislation, one “Frequently
Asked Question” posited the following:
A contractor said that he made a contribution to a political action
committee (PAC) within our county, but they have not made any
direct contributions to the local officials in office. The county
PAC supports a political party that is represented within our governing body. Is that contractor eligible for a non-fair and open
contract?
Yes. If the contractor has made contributions to a county PAC
they are not precluded from doing non-fair and open business
138
with a municipality in that county.

This acknowledges that a contractor could donate large sums of
money to the county political party, which could in turn support the
local candidates, and the donator could still receive a no-bid contract
from the municipality, thereby finding a new outlet for its contributions (and circumventing the campaign finance laws, as may be the
case). As was directly mentioned in the preamble of McGreevey’s Executive Order, it is often the “county political party committees . . .
139
[who] exert significant influence over the . . . election process.”
These county-level leaders have the private influence and political
140
power to steer municipal contracts to friendly businesses.
Moreover, public contracts at the local and county level can be just as lucrative as state level contracts:
Public contracts can be extremely lucrative. According to the
Gannett newspapers, about one third of all State contracts issued
137

See New Jersey Division of Local Services, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.nj.gov/dca/lgs/p2p/refs/p2pfaq.pdf at Question 10 (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
138
Id.
139
Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm.
140
Eileen Smith & Eric Schwartz, Norcross, Bank Enjoy Marriage of Convenience,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 27, 2004, at A1. Camden County Democratic leader and Commerce Bank executive George Norcross wields influence on
the municipal level as well, and “approximately 15 percent to 20 percent of [Commerce Bank’s Insurance] business is from negotiated, or no-bid, contracts with municipalities.” Id.
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in 2003 were unadvertised, worth a staggering total of $414 million. That sum does not include the millions more awarded at
the county and municipal levels. In that same year, the combined
sum of $91 million was raised in contributions to political committees for legislative and county elections and contributions to
141
municipal elections.

Though there are no definitive numbers available, given the size of
the budgets of New Jersey’s 566 municipalities and twenty-one county
142
governments (not to mention school districts, fire districts, etc.), it
is a reasonable inference that no-bid pay-to-play contracts at the
county and municipal level represent a greater portion of the total
pay-to-play system than do contracts at the state level, where regula143
tion is more stringent.
C. Contributions from Employees and Partners
Another loophole is that while the new pay-to-play statutes ban
businesses from making donations and receiving contracts, employ144
ees of the business can make personal donations. For many smaller
145
companies this is not applicable, but for certain entities, most notably law firms, it can be a large loophole. The legislation defines a
“business entity” to include “all principals who own or control more
than 10 percent of the profits or assets of a business entity or 10 percent of the stock in the case of a business entity that is a corporation
146
This definition allows, for example, the partners of a
for profit.”
law firm (should they own less than ten percent) to make donations

141

Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1222.
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Division of Local Government
Services, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/lgs (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (providing
budget data for New Jersey’s counties and municipalities).
143
Joe Donahue & Dunstan McNichol, Reports Tracking Pay-to-Play Online: ELEC
Data Show Firms That Donated Over $11.6M Won $5.2B in Fees, STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 11,
2007, at 13 (noting that several firms with large state government contracts, while not
donating to state political parties, gave substantial amounts to local and county political parties).
144
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.15 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). As long as an
employee does not own more than ten percent of a business, an employee can make
personal donations and not jeopardize the company’s eligibility for a public contract.
Id. § 19:44A-20.17.
145
See id. § 19:44A-20.17. The statute defines business entity and would include
contributions from a sole-proprietorship as applicable to the person, rather than the
business entity. Id. Arguably, this is unfair to larger businesses, as sole proprietorships would not be barred from receiving public contracts because their donation
was not attributable to the business.
146
Id. § 19:44A-20.17(i).
142
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147

to a candidate, and their firm can still receive no-bid public con148
It should also be noted that in many counties, the county
tracts.
149
party directly funded the campaigns of the county-wide officials.
However, since the new laws went into effect, some elected county officials (who in past campaigns never created personal candidate accounts or raised money on their own) began raising money for indi150
vidual candidate accounts.
By each candidate creating a separate
and distinct account, each candidate could individually raise the
151
maximum amount, and a firm seeking to influence a slate of
elected officials could contribute a greater aggregate amount than
would be allowable if it donated just to the county committee, as it
had done in the pre-legislation years.
D. Donations to the State Party’s Federal Account are Exempt
According to news reports, shortly after Governor Codey signed
the new pay-to-play legislation into law, Democratic Party officials be152
gan planning how to circumvent the new contribution limits.
147

Diane C. Walsh, Contractor Funds Circle Back to Democrats, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 17,
2006, at 45. For instance, since the new law went into effect:
[A] Woodbridge-based law firm that has been among the biggest contributors to the [Democratic] party, stopped donating. Between 1998
and 2004, the firm and its employees donated $390,000 to the [Middlesex] county Democrats. But in 2005, the firm did not make a single
donation, although its employees gave nearly $59,000 to the party and
an additional $30,000 to the individual accounts of county officials. . . .
[T]he managing partner . . . said individual lawyers can and have continued to donate without violating the pay-to-play ordinance because
no one owns 10 percent of the firm.
Id.
148
See New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC),
http://www.elec.state.nj.us/PublicInformation/viewreports.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2008). An extremely rudimentary search can be done via the state’s election website
by putting in the name of the law firm in the “Employer Name” field. The results
return the names of individual lawyers at these firms and the various (and numerous) donations that they have made.
149
See e.g., D’Ambrosio, supra note 68, at A1.
150
Walsh, supra note 147, at 45.
151
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-11.3 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (contribution
limits for individual candidates), with N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-11.4 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2007) (contribution limits for various committees). See also New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC), http://www.elec.state.nj.us/
forcandidates/elect_limits.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) (a user-friendly chart providing the current contribution limits for each type of source).
152
Josh Margolin & Jeff Whelan, ‘Pay-Play’ Ban Offers Democrats a Loophole—Party
Lawyer Outlines a New Route for Cash, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 24, 2005, at 1; see also Sandy
McClure, Memo to Donors Has GOP Riled Up Critics: It Dodges Pay-to-Play Ban, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Mar. 25, 2005, at A1 (explaining the purpose of the
memo).

WEBER (FINAL)

1464

12/1/2008 12:40:47 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1443

These news reports detailed that party lawyers drafted a memo to
party fund-raisers detailing how a state contractor could continue to
153
The
contribute without triggering the new pay-to-play limits.
document was distributed “just hours after Codey signed the pay-to154
play law.”
The memo advised contributors that they could “contribute up to $10,000 per year to the Democratic State Committee’s
155
federal campaign committee” without violating the statute.
The memo explained that the state party maintains a federal
campaign account for aiding presidential and congressional cam156
paigns in New Jersey.
This account, and donations to it, are regulated under federal election laws and policed by the Federal Election
157
Commission (FEC).
Thus, the New Jersey’s Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC), and the new pay-to-play statute have no
authority over this account and cannot bar donations to it to by state
158
contractors.
The Republican state party chairman disagreed with the interpretation offered by the Democratic lawyers, saying that the Republican party would not accept donations from state contractors to their
federal account, and that a Democratic attempt to do so “wouldn’t be
a loophole, it would be a glaring, giant, gaping, intentional violation
159
of the spirit of the law.”
Several days after news of this memo
leaked to media outlets, the Democrats retreated from their position
and pledged not to make use of the federal account for purposes of
160
evading the pay-to-play laws, but it remains an open question as to
how enforcement agencies such as the FEC and ELEC (and the
courts, for that matter) would have treated this type of contribution.

153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 431–56 (2000)). The Federal Election
Commission has authority over candidates for federal office (House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, and President). Id.
158
2 U.S.C. § 453 (2000). State campaign laws regarding election to a federal office are preempted by the federal campaign laws. See Id.
159
Margolin & Whelan, supra note 152, at 1.
160
Tom Moran, Democrats Back Out of a Loophole for Donors, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 30,
2005, at 13.
154
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E. Legislators Can Solicit Contributions from State Contractors
It is critical to remember that some of the most costly and closely
161
contested races in New Jersey are for the legislature.
However, the
state pay-to-play ban covers only the election accounts of the gover162
nor and the state parties.
Individual legislators have their own
campaign accounts and can still accept donations from businesses
163
Many of these legislators are very powerful,
with state contracts.
164
both in their home districts and in Trenton.
Thus, a contractor
wishing to exert some political influence on those granting the contract could donate substantial sums to influential legislators, who may
in turn lobby and push the state government to send the contract to
165
their favored contributor.
This is not to suggest that a quid pro quo exists in such a situation, as legislators do not control which bidder receives a contract; a
166
true quid pro quo is legislatively impossible.
However, legislators
have a unique ability to exert influence on state agencies and authorities through their budgetary oversight, votes on nominations, and
routine hearings into their activities. Therefore, it is reasonable to
suggest that a contractor seeking to procure state business would
make a powerful ally by donating substantial sums to legislators.
F.

The Problem of Wheeling

Some state laws have been proposed to ban the practice known
as “wheeling,” where campaign dollars are swapped among county
political parties, legislative leadership committees, and state committees to candidates for local office, purportedly to evade current con161

Donahue, supra note 29, at A1 (noting that spending for the 2007 legislative
races reached a record $69 million).
162
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
163
Id. § 19:44A-20.14. The pay-to-play ban only covers contributions to “any candidate or holder of the public office of Governor, or to any State or county political
party committee . . . .” Id.
164
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 44, at B1.
165
See Jones, supra note 44, at B1. Some legislators exert significant influence in
county organizations and municipalities around the state, including State Senator
Raymond Lesniak (D-Elizabeth) who controls the Union County Democrats. Id.
Also note that several members of the Legislature are Mayors of municipalities or
Freeholders in county governments and control contracts granted by those respective governments. See New Jersey Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
members/roster.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
166
The Executive branch, specifically the Division of Purchase and Property in the
Department of the Treasury, is the State’s central procurement agency. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:18A-3 (year). See also State of New Jersey, the Department of the Treasury,
Division of Purchase and Property, http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/purchase/ (last
visited Apr. 17, 2008).
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167

tribution limits.
It is often the county political leaders who exert
168
tremendous amounts of influence, and donations to the county
party continue the practice of pay-to-play with little to stop them.
This process is often a thinly veiled effort to skirt the contribution limits by using a different campaign committee as a middle-man.
There is a modest anti-wheeling provision, enacted by Governor
169
McGreevey, explained on the ELEC website, “[f]rom January 1st
through June 30th of each year, a county political party committee is
prohibited from making a contribution to another county political
party committee and a county political party committee is prohibited
from accepting a contribution from another county political party
170
committee.”
This is an extremely weak provision because it allows the transfer
of funds between county committees up to $37,000 in the crucial
171
time right before the election, after June 30 but before November.
The transfer of cash in itself is not illegal, and, according to the
172
ELEC, some sort of deal or agreement must be proven.
In a backroom political culture where many of the so-called bosses have per173
sonal and professional ties, there often appears to be an understanding that campaign dollars will flow to the crucial races in a
174
timely fashion.
There are many ways a business entity seeking to curry favor with
elected officials can make donations, beyond the purview of the legis167

Franzese & O’Hern, supra note 6, at 1223.
See Exec. Order No. 134, 36 N.J. REG. 4562(b) (2004), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom134.htm (discussing the influence of
county political powers).
169
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3a (West 1999 & Supp. 2007); see also New Jersey
Election Law Enforcement Commission, http://www.elec.state.nj.us/forcandidates/
elect_limits.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) (noting the limitations on county parties’
donations to each other from January 1 through June 30 of each year).
170
New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, supra note 169.
171
Id.
172
Lilo H. Stainton, ‘Wheeling’ Decried in ‘04 Ocean Campaign Hudson Donation
Matched Same Day, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Apr. 3, 2005, at A17 (quoting Frederick Hermann, executive director of the Election Law Enforcement Commission, saying, “[g]enerally speaking, you have to prove that there was some sort of
deal or agreement that this was going to happen. Just the fact that somebody made a
contribution on one day and they gave it to someone else the same day doesn’t make
it illegal. It’s a question of: Can you prove it?”).
173
Smith & Schwartz, supra note 140 (noting that Camden County Democratic
leader and Commerce Bank executive George Norcross wields considerable influence throughout New Jersey, and Middlesex County Democratic leader John Lynch
formerly sat on the Board of Commerce Bank with Norcross).
174
James W. Prado Roberts, Flow of Cash Creates Power, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury
Park, N.J.), Oct. 26, 2004, at A1.
168

WEBER (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:40:47 PM

COMMENT

1467

lation, which would then be wheeled to the intended recipient. Perhaps most importantly, on the state level there are, by statutory crea175
tion, entities known as legislative leadership committees:
The President of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate,
the Speaker of the General Assembly and the Minority Leader of
the General Assembly may each establish, authorize the establishment of, or designate one legislative leadership committee for
the purpose of receiving contributions and making expenditures
to aid or promote the candidacy of any individual, or the candidacy of individuals, for elective office in any election or the passage or defeat of a public question or public questions in any elec176
tion.

These committees can receive up to $25,000 in a year from a
177
business entity.
In turn, these so-called legislative leadership committees can donate or wheel unlimited sums to state, county, munici178
Therefore, legislative leadpal, and individual campaign accounts.
ership committees make a perfect host for transferring such
179
money.
H. Redevelopment Pay-to-Play
There is also a new and emerging problem in the field of pay-toplay, noted by the New Jersey chapter of Common Cause to be one of
the most important issues currently facing the quality of life and pub180
New Jersey is currently undergoing major
lic trust in New Jersey.
181
real estate development in urban areas. In many such areas the city

175

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-10.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
Id.
177
Id. § 19:44A-11.4 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
178
Id.; see also New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, supra note 148
(showing all the contribution limits and noting the special nature of the legislative
leadership committees); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:25-11.2 (2008) (showing no limits on
contributions received by Legislative Leadership Committees). While the state
committees can also transfer unlimited amounts of cash amongst each other, business entities cannot donate to state committees without triggering the pay-to-play
laws. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.14 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
179
See Cynthia Burton, Big Money Coming from Party Bigwigs, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 2007, at B1.
180
See Common Cause New Jersey, www.commoncause.org/newjersey (follow
“Redevelopment Pay-to-Play Reform” hyperlink under “Our Issues”). “Redevelopment decisions have profound impacts on the quality of life of our citizens and it is
critical that they be made based on the public interest, not as a reward to big contributors and politically connected players.” Id.
181
See, e.g., Antoinette Martin, Can a Face Lift Offer a New Identity?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2006, Real Estate, at 11, (noting that, for instance, there is promising ongoing
redevelopment in Rahway, New Jersey, where eminent domain, condemnation by the
176
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has created redevelopment zones and controls the development
182
Developers comrights to abandoned or dilapidated properties.
pete heavily for the redevelopment rights to these areas, which are
controlled and granted by the municipality or county, along with
generous “loans, grants, tax breaks or the use of public condemna183
tion powers.”
These redevelopment agreements would not fall under the payto-play provisions, which cover only “services or furnishing of any material, supplies or equipment or for the acquisition, sale, or lease of
184
In these new redevelopment situations, the
any land or building.”
builder is not purchasing land from the state. Therefore, they are
not barred from making donations. As has been discussed, this statute applies only to the state and its many authorities, and not to
185
Furthermore, it is often engineering
counties and municipalities.
firms, consultants, and attorneys, working on behalf of (or in collusion with) developers, who make donations to those who control the
186
development rights.
V. PROPOSED MODELS FOR REFORM
A. Proposed Bills in New Jersey
In response to criticisms that New Jersey’s initial reforms of the
campaign finance system did not go far enough, there have been several bills proposed in the legislature to reform the system. From the
previous section discussing the shortcomings of the current state system, it is clear that reform is needed.
The most obvious reform would be a total ban on direct corporate donations and donations from their Continuing Political Com187
mittees.
There does not seem to be much public impetus for such

redevelopment agency, and private development are transforming the economy of a
city).
182
Id.
183
Joe Donohue, Pay-to-Play Limitations Take Shape in Trenton, STAR-LEDGER, Oct.
24, 2006, at 16.
184
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.15 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
185
See supra Part III.B.
186
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.14 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). A law firm or engineering firm could donate as much as it wanted to a state agency or authority, and
since the public contract would be going to the developer itself and not to the lawyers or engineers, the pay-to-play statutes would not be triggered because the law
firm or engineering firm would not fall under the definition of an ineligible contributor. Id.
187
See, e.g., A398, 213th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2007).
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a ban in New Jersey, though roughly half the states have completely
188
Short of a total ban on all
banned direct corporate contributions.
corporate contributions, there is an impetus to tighten the rules on
those businesses seeking and holding government contracts. Many
have called for an outright statewide ban on pay-to-play applicable at
189
However, with New Jerall levels of government by the legislature.
190
sey’s strong history of “home rule,” it is not clear that the legislature
and governor will seek to promulgate the entire spectrum of campaign finance and contract procurement as a purely state-level issue,
as doing so would be politically risky in a state where local leaders are
extremely influential statewide.
Such legislation would certainly be constitutional, as there is a
compelling state government interest in curbing the appearance of
corruption at all levels of government, and it has been shown that all
levels of government (state, county, local) are intertwined and inter191
dependent in New Jersey’s campaign finance system.
If proposed
legislation regulating campaign contributions could merely describe
and detail a “sufficient linkage between the award of state contracts
and contributions to county committees, a court is likely to find that
the limitation is closely drawn to match the sufficiently important
government interest of upholding the integrity of the state contract192
ing process.” Thus, it would not be unconstitutional for the state to
enact a uniform pay-to-play ban on all levels of government, whereby
a prospective contractor’s donations to any candidate or committee at
any level of government would bar that business from receiving a nobid contract from all levels of government.
However, in the event that the legislature and the governor will
not enact pay-to-play legislation regulating all levels of government,
there are a number of actions that could be taken to eliminate the
gaps in the current statutory framework, and expand the scope of the
current law. For instance, an Assembly Bill says that a business that
“has made a campaign contribution would be prohibited for one year
from performing a contract for a public entity at any level of govern193
And as a penment until one year after the contribution is made.”
alty, a business that “willfully and knowingly violates the bill’s provi188

Public Affairs Council, supra note 90.
See supra Part III.B.
190
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (8th ed. 2004). “A state legislative provision or
action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local government, conditional on its
acceptance of certain terms.” Id.
191
See supra Parts III.B and III.G.
192
Sholk, supra note 103, at 40.
193
A691, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006) (emphasis added).
189
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sions would be subject to a penalty of up to twice the value of its con194
tract and debarment from public contracting for up to five years.”
Another proposed bill would bar any business entity making a
campaign contribution from performing any government contract in
195
excess of $17,500 for one year.
This bill essentially recognizes that
under New Jersey’s pay-to-play and contract procurement laws, a
business making donations is barred only from no-bid contracts but
196
can currently still receive contracts that have been put out to bid.
197
Furthermore, since the awarding agencies have wide latitude, payto-play is ongoing. This bill would bar donating businesses from receiving contracts that have been advertised and competitively bid,
supplementing the current legislation that applies only to no-bid contracts.
Governor Corzine has publicly said that he wants to close the socalled ten percent loophole, where partners in law firms and other
businesses are free to give as much as is allowable, so long as they own
less than ten percent of the business which is bidding on a state con198
tract.
This would be a substantial reform, as some partnerships
(law firms, specifically) are among the biggest participants in the pay199
to-play system. Currently, bill A1488 in the Assembly would change
the definition of “business entity” to include “all principals who own
two percent or more of the equity in the corporation or business
200
trust . . . .” This bill would have a drastic effect on the ability of the
partners in some of New Jersey’s larger law firms to make donations
to their favored candidate, as doing so would bar their firms from receiving no-bid state contracts.
During the 2005 gubernatorial campaign, candidate Corzine
201
pledged to end the practice of “wheeling.”
As of yet, this has not
been accomplished. However, some members of the legislature have
drafted bills to end the practice and tighten current regulations.
One proposed Assembly Bill “provides that no county committee of a
political party may make a contribution of money or other thing of
194

Id.
A528, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
196
See supra Part III.A.
197
Id.
198
Joe Donahue, Pay-to-Play Ban Working . . . Some Say Too Well: Analysis Shows Many
Once-Generous Firms Have Cut Back on Donations in N.J., STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
June 11, 2006, at 1.
199
See supra Part III.C.
200
A1488, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
201
Editorial, Slow Road to Reform; Towns, Counties Get OK to End Pay-to-Play, BERGEN
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 12, 2005, at L6.
195
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value to any other such committee, nor may any such committee ac202
cept a contribution from a county committee of a political party.”
Essentially, this bill would take the current ban on transferring
203
money from January 1 through June 30, and extend it throughout
the entire year. A violation would be a crime of the third degree, carrying a penalty of three to five years in prison and a fine of up to
204
There is also a proposal that would bar county commit$15,000.
tees, other than the home county of a candidate, from making donations greater than $7200, rather than the $37,000 which is currently
205
allowable.
Additional bills are pending in the legislature that go much further to reign in the influence of money on elections. For instance,
Assembly Bill A1682 would abolish legislative leadership commit206
tees, reduce the maximum annual contribution to state parties
from $25,000 to $12,500, reduce the yearly contribution limit to
county parties from $37,000 to $10,000, and reduce the contribution
207
limit to individual candidates from $7200 to $5000 per year. There
is also a bill which would make the contribution limit $2000 for all
elective offices, bringing New Jersey’s campaign limits comparable to
208
federal limits.
As Governor Corzine and Senate President Codey have made
209
public pledges to reform New Jersey’s culture of corruption, and
there is significant public support for such bills, it is possible that the
legislature and the governor will seek to implement a reform package
210
in the near future.
202

A1489, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3a (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
204
A1489, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
205
A1484, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
206
See supra Parts III.E & III.G.
207
A1682, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
208
S1466, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
209
See Codey, supra note 4 (Governor Codey reiterating his pledge to ban pay-toplay at all levels of government and institute a ban on wheeling); see also Jon Corzine,
New Jersey Governor, State of the State Address (Jan. 9, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/approved/20070109.html) (“On ethics
reform, we should push even further with a ban on wheeling and pay-to-play at all
levels of government.”).
210
It should be noted that Republicans in electorally competitive legislative districts proposed several of these reform bills. As the Assembly and Senate are currently under Democratic control, it is doubtful that many of these proposals will ever
come up for a vote in front of the full legislature, as it would grant a major legislative
victory to the Republican opposition. See, e.g., A102, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006);
A691, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006); A1484, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006);
A1487, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006); A1489, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). As203
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B. The Connecticut Model
In June 2004, two months before Governor McGreevey’s resignation in New Jersey, John Rowland, the Republican Governor of Connecticut, resigned amid a scandal involving state contractors doing
211
work on his home.
Rowland’s successor as governor, M. Jodi Rell,
and the Connecticut Legislature passed a series of campaign finance
reforms, similar in many respects to the reform efforts instituted by
Governors McGreevey and Codey during New Jersey’s transition of
212
power. The subsequent legislation passed by Connecticut and New
Jersey took varied approaches to correcting a similar problem: the
pervasive influence of government contractor campaign donations in
state politics.
The Connecticut statutory framework is more restrictive than
213
New Jersey’s version, holding “[n]o business entity shall make any
contributions or expenditures to, or for the benefit of, any candi214
date’s campaign for election to any public office,” and goes on to
bar not only these corporate donations, but also donations from any
“officer, director, owner, limited or general partner or holder of
stock constituting five per cent or more of the total outstanding stock
215
Contrasted with New Jersey’s
of any class of the business entity.”
laws that allow businesses to make donations (so long as the procurement laws are followed) and do not bar most partners and directors from donating as well, it is clear that Connecticut’s legislation is
216
more restrictive.
Additionally, Connecticut legislators set more restrictive contri217
For example, in
bution limits than New Jersey’s legislators passed.

semblyman (now Senator) Bill Baroni (R-Mercer/Middlesex) was a sponsor on each
of these bills. See id. Baroni represents one of the few districts with a two-party legislative delegation. New Jersey Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
members/roster.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
211
William Yardley, Under Pressure, Rowland Resigns Governor’s Post, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2004, at A1.
212
Avi Salzman, On the Lookout for Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at 14CN-19
(giving an overview of Connecticut’s recent reform efforts).
213
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-601(8) (West 2002 & Supp. forthcoming) (defining
“business entity” to include corporations, partnerships, etc.).
214
Id. § 9-613(a) (emphasis added).
215
Id.
216
Id. § 9-615. Connecticut does allow business political committees to make donations, with limits up to $5000 for gubernatorial candidates. See id.
217
See Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission, Contribution Limits, http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/contribution_limits_2007.pdf (last visited Apr.
17, 2008) (posting an updated chart for current contribution limits).
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New Jersey, a business-created PAC can donate up to $7200 to a
candidate (for any level of elective office), while a similar PAC in
Connecticut would be limited to a $5000 donation to a gubernatorial
candidate, $1500 to a State legislative candidate, and as little as $375
219
Since Connecticut and New Jersey are
to a city council candidate.
in the same region, have similarly wealthy populations (compared to
the rest of the nation), and operate within the same New York City
media market, it would be difficult to argue that New Jersey candidates require such larger donations than candidates in Connecticut
require to run similar campaigns. If one is to believe that more re220
strictive contribution limits are a positive reform, then certainly
New Jersey’s limits are higher than is necessary.
C. The Argument for Preserving the Status Quo
Beyond those who call for the outright elimination of campaign
finance restrictions, some feel New Jersey’s current pay-to-play law is
working, and further reform is not needed. These anti-reformists
want to preserve the status quo, fearing that further tightening the
221
system will have negative repercussions.
Anti-reformists also note
that “donations to the Democratic State Committee . . . dropped seventy-eight percent from its recent peak in 2001 through 2005, and
contractor donations to the PAC plunged eighty-six percent in the
222
same period,” after the pay-to-play law was enacted.
Furthermore, “[c]ontractor contributions to the ‘big six’ fundraising committees—the two state party committees and four legislative leadership PACs—fell from $5.4 million in 2001 to $1.8 million
223
[in 2005].”
Beyond the argument made above that the money is

218

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
See Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission, supra note 217.
220
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 19, at 1736.
221
Donahue, supra note 198, at 1. Assemblyman Joe Cryan, Chairman of the N.J.
Democratic State Committee, said that the pay-to-play law is “chasing good people
from the process. It’s as if we’ve made participating in the process something wrong,
something un-American.” Id.
222
Id. (“In 2004, one-third of the money the [Democratic State Committee] raised
came from contractors; last year [2005], it was 6 percent.”).
223
Id.; see also James W. Prado Roberts & Gergory J. Volpe, Political Contributors
Take Detour Around New Rules, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 2, 2007,
at A1.
Overall giving by all businesses and their political action committees to
county and state parties has similarly dropped—from a peak of $20 million in 2003 to just $3.3 million in 2005, and $1.6 million last year, according to state Election Law Enforcement Commission records. In
2003, the Democratic State Committee raised 70 percent of its $14 mil219
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merely flowing to other outlets and has not been eliminated from the
224
system, there are other factors that may explain the above date,
225
such as that Governor Corzine largely self-funded his campaign and
perhaps was not as aggressive in fundraising as his predecessors.
Senate President Codey noted that the legislature has “cut off so
many avenues to raise money—at what point can only the
rich run? . . . At what point do you hinder people of regular means
226
Others
against someone with unlimited resources of their own?”
have echoed this thought, noting that “restrictions on private donors
give a bigger advantage to candidates like Corzine and his 2005 opponent for governor, Republican Doug Forrester, who are wealthy
227
enough to bankroll their own campaigns.”
VI. THE REFORMS NEW JERSEY SHOULD ADOPT
The pay-to-play reforms enacted through Governor McGreevey’s
Executive Order and the subsequent legislation were perceived as a
major victory for campaign reform in New Jersey. Their effect, however, has been minimal. Though it perhaps took several scandals and
228
indictments of public officials to push the issue to the forefront, the
influence of contractors on state candidates has, it appears, decreased
229
since the enactment. More importantly, the pay-to-play statute and
subsequent enabling legislation allows for county and local governments to begin more stringently regulating their own campaigns. In
this sense, the reforms have an aggregate positive effect on the system, as many local and county governments have also passed more
stringent reforms.
But logically, pay-to-play and all campaign finance should be
uniformly regulated by the state, rather than piecemeal, where every
individual municipality and county has a unique campaign finance
law. The state is already the regulatory body for policing elections

lion in receipts from businesses; last year businesses giving to that
committee amounted to just 10 percent, according to ELEC records.
Id.
224

Supra Part III.
Patrick D. Healy, Pity the Rich In Politics: They Tend To Fare Poorly, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2005, §1, at 37 (noting that Corzine spent $43 million on his gubernatorial
victory).
226
Tom Moran, For Real Reform, Corzine Needs GOP, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Oct. 13, 2006, at 23.
227
Donahue, supra note 198, at 1.
228
See NJ.com, supra note 16.
229
Donahue, supra note 198, at 1.
225
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230

and filing reports.
Furthermore, local and county elections are
heavily influenced by state parties, PACs, and outside county commit231
tees not under the jurisdiction of individual towns and counties.
After leaving office, Governor McGreevey acknowledged that prospective contractors made donations to entities other than his specific
232
This is definicampaign committee in an effort to influence him.
tive proof that campaign money in New Jersey changes hands and is
transferred among campaign entities with the underlying purpose of
influence. Thus, it should be centrally regulated by the state.
There is no valid policy reason why the state should not ban payto-play at the local level, other than New Jersey’s history of allowing
municipalities wide discretion in managing their own affairs. However, this is a historical rather than a practical reason, and in today’s
evolved system of campaigning, best practices would dictate that a
uniform statewide ban on pay-to-play at all levels of government
would be more practical than a patchwork system of different standards at local levels. As the state already governs nearly all aspects of
campaign law and regulation, it is counter-intuitive to argue that a variety of local pay-to-play measures would be preferable or stronger
than a statewide initiative. As was discussed previously, Connecticut
has a model that New Jersey legislators would be wise to study and
possibly adopt.
An absolutely necessary reform in New Jersey is a stronger provision to ban wheeling, as the current statutory language is grossly inadequate and does little to stop the large-scale transfers of cash
among party committees during campaigns. There is a counterargument against such a law, as some party insiders believe that growing a political party in an area where it is historically weak requires
the influence and outside help from state leaders and county com233
mittees from where the party is historically strong.
Such proponents feel they are building a stronger statewide political base by infusing weaker county and municipal committees with an influx of

230

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-8.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (stating all candidate committees must file with ELEC).
231
See supra Parts III.B and III.G.
232
MCGREEVEY WITH FRANCE, supra note 41, at 337.
233
Stainton, supra note 172, at A17 (noting that the Hudson County donor and
the Ocean County Democratic Chairman in question defended the transfer of funds
as the financially strong Democrats in Hudson County merely helping to strengthen
the Democratic party in other parts of the state). Every state legislator from Hudson
County is a Democrat, while none of the state legislators from Ocean County is Democrat. See New Jersey Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/members/
roster.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
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cash, as weaker county parties are unable to raise such funds them234
This is a reasonable argument, though somewhat disinselves.
genuous. Investigative reports have shown that the cash is not routinely going to underperforming counties, but rather back to the
strong county committees, and that the transfers are largely used to
235
circumvent the contribution limit laws, not to build the party.
There is danger in some of the proposed reforms. The pro236
posed bill to abolish legislative leadership committees altogether
goes too far. Legislative leadership committees are invaluable tools
for maintaining party order and discipline, though some would argue
237
this stifles independence and is hardly a positive attribute. It is imperative that legislative leaders raise money to fund campaigns that
would otherwise attract little attention. To reform these committees,
the Legislature should ban the legislative leadership committees’
power to transfer cash to anything other than a legislative candidate
committee. The ability of these specially created committees to wheel
cash to county, municipal, and other state committees has harmed
their image and is contrary to their statutory purpose.
Another sensible proposal is to lower all the contribution limits.
It is a somewhat bizarre system of campaign finance in which candidates at the local level in New Jersey, seeking perhaps as little as a few
thousand votes, can legally raise more money from an individual, a
Continuing Political Committee (or PAC), and of course a business,
238
than a candidate for U.S. Senate, Congress, or even President. The
contribution limits, it would appear, are artificially high for candi-

234

Stainton, supra note 172, at A17.
Id. (noting that the money did not stay with the Ocean County Democrats for
party building efforts but was transferred back to Jersey City council candidates almost immediately).
236
A1682, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
237
The Legislative Leadership Committees raise large amounts of money, and
spend nearly all of it every cycle getting their members re-elected. Since the leader
of that caucus has complete control over this committee, they have complete discretion as to which candidates will receive the money. Arguably, this could force legislators to vote in lock-step with the leadership.
238
The federal limit for an individual donating to presidential, senate, or congressional candidates is $2300. Federal Election Commission, Quick Answers [hereinafter FEC Quick Answers], http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_general.shtml#
How_much_can_I_contribute (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). But importantly, a New
Jersey candidate could receive up to $8200 from a CPC, while a Federal candidate
could receive $5000, or perhaps as little as $2300, depending on the type of PAC.
New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, Contribution Limits [hereinafter
NJELEC Contribution Limits], http://www.elec.state.nj.us/forcandidates/elect_
limits.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
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dates for minor elected offices, and it would be logical and appropriate to bring New Jersey’s contribution limits in line with the federal limits. Opponents of this measure would argue that such limits
are unneeded, as there are less stringent restrictions on campaign
donations in neighboring states, such as Pennsylvania, which do have
240
the same aura of corruption as New Jersey.
What policy argument can be made for having individual contribution limits greater than the current $2300 limit for individual contributions and $5000 PAC contributions to federal candidates? Campaign spending reports confirm that federal candidates have no
241
problem raising a sufficient amount of funds. It seems evident that
something is awry when an individual in New Jersey can contribute
$2600 to a candidate for minor office in New Jersey, but only $2300
to a Presidential candidate. Moreover, a business can directly contribute $2600 to a New Jersey candidate, but nothing to a federal
candidate; a CPC could contribute $8200 to a New Jersey candidate,
but a PAC only $5000 to a federal candidate; and other party committees (county, state, or legislative leadership committee) can contribute unlimited amounts to a New Jersey candidate committee, but these
same party committees may only contribute $5000 combined to federal
242
candidates.
This is not to say that the federal system is perfect—far from it.
However, aligning all facets of New Jersey’s campaign finance system
with the current federal law would be a positive step. Drastically scaling back contribution limits to individual candidate committees, as
well as tighter restrictions on corporate contributions (perhaps even
a total ban) would, at minimum, show that New Jersey elected officials are committed to stemming corruption and the appearance of
corruption.
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (finding that contribution limits are
subject to the closest scrutiny and must be “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms”).
240
See 25 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3241–3260 (West 1994 & Supp. 2006). There is no
Pennsylvania statute limiting the amount that can be contributed to a state candidate.
241
Anne Kornblut, Menendez Retains His Senate Seat; Lieberman Finally Prevails Over
Lamont, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P6. Senator Menendez raised $10 million on his
own and received another $9 million from national Democrats, and Tom Kean Jr.
raised over $5 million on his own and received about $5 million from the national
GOP in their 2006 N.J. Senate race. Id.
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See FEC Quick Answers, supra note 238; NJELEC Contribution Limits, supra
note 238.

